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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND
METHODOLOGY
RACHEL A. VAN CLEAVE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, former Justice Brennan presented his famous speech, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights,' urging state judges to look to the
constitutional guarantees set forth in their state charters rather than rely
automatically on United States Supreme Court interpretation of the federal Bill of
Rights. The former justice emphasized that
state courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full
protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which
has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the
independent protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of
our liberties cannot be guaranteed.2
Twenty years after Brennan's call, we can evaluate the extent to which state
courts have accepted the challenge and taken heed. Over the last two decades two
phases of the state constitutional revolution emerge. First, are questions relating to
what I will call "methods of interpretation" which center upon whether the state
court will look to the state constitution first3 in its analysis and at what point, if at
all, will the state court rely on the federal constitution and precedent. Essentially
these questions focus on when a state court will engage in state constitutional
analysis. Second, are questions concerning "theories of interpretation" which
involve the more difficult inquiry of how the state court will go about interpreting
the state document.
Scholarly commentary similarly corresponds to these phases. Initially, the debate
centered on questions such as whether state courts should first examine their own
charters, and then look to federal law, or whether state courts should first resolve
an issue under federal law and then look for reasons to depart from federal
interpretation, and whether states should interpret their own constitutions in a
manner consistent with federal interpretation of similar provisions. Scholars
currently seem to agree that state constitutional issues should be resolved first under
the state's charter.4 However, there is still disagreement regarding when and if
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech Univezsity School of Law. I thank the staff of the New Mexico
Law Review and Professors Christian G. Fritz and Michael B. Browde for giving me the opportunity to present this
at the State Constitutional Law Symposium. I also thank my research assistants, Amy Hale and Wesley Prewitt for
their efforts, and Joseph Schottland for advice and support.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L REV.
489 (1977).
2. Id. at 491.
3. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L
REv. 379 (1980)
4. See Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium
on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L REV. 13, 21 (1988) (stating that it is not controversial that
where a case raises both state and federal constitutional claims, courts should look to state claims first). See
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discussion of the federal constitution should enter the analysis. More recently
scholars have pointed out the important role of state courts in the discourse and
debate on constitutionalism and the need to focus on theory in the state courts to
further this debate.5 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that state constitutional
scholars begin to work with federal constitutional scholars to examine methods of
interpretation that may be appropriate for state constitutions.6
The question of constitutional theory in state courts often results in a comparative
analysis of the state and federal constitutions. Typically where a comparative
analysis is used, the purpose is to support the authority of the state court to interpret
the state document independently and to justify an interpretation and result that
diverge from federal precedent. While this approach may add to the persuasiveness
of the opinion, it does little to advance the role of state courts in the dialogue of
constitutionalism. The critical tension in state constitutionalism is between the need
to persuade critics that the state court is justified when it diverges from federal
precedent, and the goal of having a voice in constitutional discourse and debate.
7
In seeking to persuade critics, state courts tend to rely extensively on differences
between the federal and the state constitutions. However, it is precisely this
"discourse of distinctness"' which other critics claim results in isolationism of the
state and irrelevance in constitutionalism generally.9
This paper first discusses the significance of state constitutional law, which is
important background and support for the rest of the paper. Second, the paper traces
some of the history of state constitutional interpretation, centering on the question
of when a state court should engage in independent analysis, and discussing some
examples of courts stating expressly which method it will follow, and others
illustrating a troubled history of attempting to answer this question. Next, the focus
shifts to address the question of how independent interpretation has been carried
out, and some of the problems involved and the pressures faced by state courts. In
addition, this paper makes suggestions as to how to better enrich and enhance the
process of independent interpretation by state courts in a way which furthers the
development of constitutional jurisprudence of the state court and contributes to
constitutionalism in general. For example, one practical suggestion calls for the
amendment of a state's Rules of Court to require counsel to raise and brief issues
under the state constitution and to require courts to address the state constitutional
questions before resolving any federal constitutional claims.
generally, Linde, supra note 3. Cf James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MiCH.
L REV. 761 (1992).
5. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L REV. 1147
(1993); Ronald K.L Collins and Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985 Survey of
State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L REV. 317, 328 (1986) (describing state court
decisions which are more concerned with methods of analysis than results); G. Alan Tarr. Understanding State
Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L REV. 1169, 1193 (1992) (urging scholars and courts to broaden their focus of
constitutional theory beyond the United State Constitution).
6. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RuTGERS L.J. 841
(1991).
7. See Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L REV. 215 (1992).
8. Gardner, supra note 4, at 777.
9. See Kahn, supra note 5, at 1152.
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II. WHY INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION?
Independent interpretation by state courts of their state constitutions is important
because it returns states to their original role of protecting the rights of the people
in their states, fulfills the role of state courts as interpreters of their state charters
and has the potential for increasing the importance of state court contributions to
constitutional discourse where state courts take approaches which differ from
federal constitutional analysis.
The history of state constitutions as the only protectors of individual rights is
well documented. ° During the period called "dual federalism,"'" the federal Bill of
Rights served only to limit the federal government from infringing on individual
rights, and was not a limitation on the states.'2 Thus, states historically had the
burden of serving as the primary protectors of individual rights. While, there are
numerous examples of states failing in that role, 3 this realm was, nonetheless, said
to be of the states. The United States Supreme Court sought to bring states in line
with federal protection of individual rights by incorporating nearly all of the
provisions of the federal Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the states. 4 Now that individuals are afforded
basic protection of certain rights, that is, the establishment of a federal floor, the
dangers of state abuse are reduced, and minimum protections are ensured while
state courts experiment with different theories of analysis.
As to the duty of state courts to interpret their constitutions, numerous state
constitutions have express provisions setting out this duty, 5 while the federal courts
rely on Marbury v. Madison.6 To the extent that state courts do not examine the
state constitution, or defer to federal precedent, they shirk their judicial duties. As
former California Supreme Court Justice Tobriner stated:
Just as the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate judicial
responsibility for determining matters of federal law, this court bears the
ultimate judicial responsibility for resolving questions of state law, including the
proper interpretation of provisions of the state constitution. In fulfilling this
difficult and grave responsibility, we cannot properly relegate our task to the
judicial guardians of the federal Constitution, but instead must recognize our
10. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 588 (1987); 2 BERNARD
SCHWARIZ, THE ROOTS O1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS 436 (1980); Hans A. linde, First Things First. Rediscovering the
States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L REv. 379, 380-82 (1980); BARRY LATzER, STATE CONSTIfUTIONS AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 13-14 (1991); John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional
Law-Why Don't the Primacy States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L REV. 1019, 1022-23 (1993)
(examining the Oregon Supreme Court's application of the "primacy" approach).
11. Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law: Exploring the Limits of Florida's "Forced
Linkage" Amendment, 39 U. FA. L. REV. 653, 657 (1987).
12. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confession procured by police torture of the
defendant).
14. See Brennan, supra note 1. at 493-94.
15. See, e.g., CoLO. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("[W]henever an attempt is made to take private property for a use
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question ....");
N.D. CONST. art VI, § 4 ("A majority of the supreme court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to
pronounce a decision, provided that the supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional
unless at least four of the members of the court so decide.").
16. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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personal obligation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining the
meaning and application of state constitutional provisions. 7
The issue of the duty of state courts raises an important point of comparison
between state supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court. As one scholar
has noted, the United States Supreme Court "is ever mindful that its ruling apply
throughout the land, and accordingly they must be sensitive to the disparities in
local needs and local conditions from state to state and respectful of the need for
and the virtues of diversity."'" Due to the national application of Supreme Court
decisions, one commentator has pointed out the different roles played by the
national and state supreme courts. The "United States Supreme Court, in reading
the federal constitution, must lay out a minimal rule for a diverse nation, with due
concern for principles of federalism. State courts, . . . , have a different focus, which
is to fashion workable rules for a narrower, more specific range of people and
situations."' 9 Given these differences between the federal and state courts, it is not
surprising that the federal floor established by the United States Supreme Court is
simply a bare minimum of standards, and that differences under state constitutions
will usually result in greater protection. Most importantly, independent state
constitutional interpretation aids in the development of state constitutional law, thus
fulfilling a state court's duty under its state constitution, regardless of the results
reached.
In their historic role as primary protectors of rights, state courts have contributed
to constitutional analysis. Many of the examples of state courts leading the way in
constitutionalism are from the California Supreme Court, once regarded as "the
birthplace of th[e] new judicial independence."
20 For example, in Weeks v. United
States2 ' the United States Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule relying, in
part, on the fact that some states had adopted such a rule. When the United States
Supreme Court later decided to apply the exclusionary rule to the states through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio,
22 the Court
again considered state precedents. The Court relied on the determination by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Cahan,
23 that no other remedy had succeeded
in securing compliance with constitutional provisions.
24
With respect to discrimination in the selection of petit juries, the California
Supreme Court decided in 1978 to no longer follow the United States Supreme
Court decision in Swain v. Alabama,' which imposed a tremendous burden of proof
17. People v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
18. Louis D. Bilionis, Essay, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1803, 1809-10
n.23 (1992) (citing the dissent of Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), as a
"classic" elaboration of this point).
19. Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of American
Federalism, 13 VT. L. REv. 49, 55 (1988).
20. Jeffrey White, Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court
Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 737, 740 (1976).
21. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23. 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955).
24. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651-52.
25. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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on a defendant challenging a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes as racially
motivated. Instead, in People v. Wheeler,26 the California Supreme Court, dispens-
ing with the requirement of showing a discriminatory use of peremptory strikes over
a series of cases, set out a procedure by which one could challenge an opponent's
use of strikes in an individual case. The burden-shifting procedure adopted by the
California Supreme Court closely parallels the procedure ultimately adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, six years later.28
Such instances of state recognition and protection of rights before consideration
by the United States Supreme Court further contribute to federal analysis by
providing the Supreme Court with examples from which to draw on in interpreting
the federal constitution. The right to privacy is an example. In 1948, the California
Supreme Court, in Perez v. Lippold,29 declared invalid statutes forbidding "mixed
race" marriages. In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held invalid a similar
law in Loving v. Virginia.3" In 1966, the California Supreme Court recognized an
individual's right to privately possess obscene materials in one's home.3 Three
years later, in Stanley v. Georgia,32 the United States Supreme Court recognized
such a right. In 1969, the California Supreme Court recognized "[t]he fundamental
right of the woman to choose whether to bear children" as following "from the
Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a 'right of privacy'
or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family, and sex." 3 The United States
Supreme Court recognized such a right under the federal constitution four years
later in Roe v. Wade.34 While the California Supreme Court was not as clear as it
could have been with respect to which constitution it was relying on, by citing to
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the court appears to have adopted the cited
federal cases as part of California Constitutional law.36
By becoming accustomed to independently examining their state's charter, even
when language is substantially similar to language found in the federal Bill of
Rights, state courts can become more familiar with their state's constitutional
history and become more adept at developing theories of constitutional
interpretation. This is especially important where a state constitution contains rights
not expressly provided for in the federal constitution and not protected by United
States Supreme Court interpretation of the federal constitution. For example, the
North Carolina Constitution states that "[t]he people have a right to the privilege of
26. 583 P.2d 748, 763-64 (Cal. 1978).
27. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
28. While the procedures employed by the two courts are very similar, Batson was decided on equal
protection grounds, while Wheeler was based on the California Constitutional protection of a fair trial by a
representative cross-section, a basis expressly rejected by the Court in Batson. 476 U.S. at 84 n.4.
29. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
30. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
31. See In re Klor, 415 P.2d 791 (Cal. 1966).
32. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
33. People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969) (emphasis added). Belous involved the conviction of
a doctor who provided a patient with the name of another doctor who performed abortions. The appeal was
primarily concerned with the question of whether the exception to the statutory prohibition of abortion, "necessary
to preserve the life of the woman," was unconstitutionally vague. The court found that it was too vague on its face.
34. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy prohibits state from proscribing use of contraceptives).
36. See Belous, 458 P.2d at 199.
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education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.""' Such
a provision allows for a very different kind of analysis than available under the
federal constitution, which does not expressly guarantee such a right."a
The California Constitution expressly guarantees as an "inalienable right... [in]
pursuing and obtaining ... privacy."39 This express right allows for a different
analysis of privacy rights, than under the "penumbral" analysis of the United States
Supreme Court.' The California Constitution also provides that "[a] person may not
be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or
employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.""' An
earlier version42 of this provision provided the basis for the California Supreme
Court's decision in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,43 to strike down a law which
prohibited most women from bartending. The point of listing these textual
differences between the state and federal constitutions is to illustrate that in the
absence of independent interpretation, courts and litigators may overlook important
textual differences." For example, some states, including California,45 guarantee
equal "privileges" and "immunities '' which, one commentator argues, provides for
a very different type of analysis than the federal Equal Protection Clause.47 Despite
this textual difference, state courts have simply assumed that the state guarantee
paralleled the federal equal protection clause, without considering the reasons for
such textual differences.4 The federal equal protection provision was a result of the
Civil War, and grew out of a concern to protect blacks from oppression.49 While the
California Constitution contains language similar to the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it also contains a provision which states that "[a]
citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted
on the same terms to all citizens."50 Similar provisions in other state
37. N.C. CONST. art. L § 15. See also James G. Exum, Jr., Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C. L
REV. 1741, 1747 (1992).
38. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (declining to hold that education
is a fundamental interest).
39. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
40. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
41. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8.
42. "No person shall on account of sex be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business,
vocation or profession." CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 18 (1879). For a thorough history of this provision, see Barbara
Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: Constitution-Maker, 66 IND. L.J. 849 (1991).
43. 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971).
44. See Charles G. Douglas, Ill, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REv. 127, 135 (1988)
(arguing why textual differences between the state and federal constitutions illustrate why "nationalization of rights
makes no sense").
45. See CAL. CONST. art. L § 7(b) (providing that "[a] citizen or class of citizens may not be granted
privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens").
46. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20.
47. See David Schumann, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities": A State's Version of "Equal
Protection", 13 VT. L. REV. 221,227 (1988).
48. See State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 448 A.2d 791 (Vt. 1982) (law requiring Sunday closure of all
large supermarkets analyzed under federal Equal Protection Clause. The state court looked for reasons to depart
from recent federal precedent where text of Vermont constitution differed significantly). For an analysis of Ludlow,
see Frank G. Mahady, Toward a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L
REV. 145 (1988).
49. See Tarr, supra note 6, at 859.
50. CAL. CONST. art. I. § 7(b).
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constitutions 51 were "usually intended to protect the majority against legislative
creation of special privileges or exemptions that destroy equality."52
When state courts are in the habit of examining their own constitutional
heritages, even where the federal constitution includes a parallel right, state courts
will be better equipped to analyze language in their charters which is not present in
the federal constitution.53 Therefore, independent interpretation is essential to the
development of state constitutional law because it requires state courts to learn more
about their state's constitutional beginnings and subsequent constitutional changes.
In addition to the above considerations, lack of independent state constitutional
interpretation is likely to stagnate constitutional analysis. Where a state court is in
the habit of deferring to federal interpretation of constitutional rights, it is in the
position of having to guess how the United States Supreme Court is likely to rule
on a similar issue in the future. To avoid the risk of later reversal, such a state court
is likely to apply extremely narrow interpretations of federal precedent rather than
venture into uncharted analysis. For example, in 1992, an appellate court in
Maryland54 faced the question of whether the procedure set out in Batson v.
Kentucky,55 to preclude the exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner, applied to gender-based peremptory challenges. Rather than
analyze the arguments relevant to this question, the court concluded that since the
United States Supreme Court had not yet extended Batson to gender-based strikes,
it "would be presumptuous on our part" to extend Batson.56 Similarly, in a recent
California case involving the constitutionality of religious invocations and
benedictions at high school graduation ceremonies a concurring justice stated that
the state court would "do well to invite and await [the United States Supreme
Court's] views before giving final and definitive answers to complex and difficult
questions of constitutional law. In this way, we can give appropriate deference to
its views . . . ."" When state courts take the position that they should not embark on
federal constitutional interpretation until the United States Supreme Court has been
presented with the issue, they deprive the state constitution of its independent force.
In addition, such a stance also deprives the United States Supreme Court of the
brain power and creativity of state judges, which can provide the Supreme Court
with alternative modes of analysis for resolving the particular issue.
51. See, e.g., ARrZ. CONST. art. II, § 13 ("No Law shall be enacted granting to any citizens, class of citizens,
or corporation... privilegesor immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or
corporations"). See also Schumann, supra note 47, at 222.
52. Tarr, supra note 6, at 860.
53. See id. at 855 (suggesting analysis of state constitutional provisions in light of the character of state
constitutions as compared to the character of the federal constitution).
54. See Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), rev'd sub nom Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d
648 (Md. 1993).
55. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
56. Eiland, 607 A.2d at 59. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the court of special appeals, finding
that gender-based peremptory strikes violated the state constitution. See Tyler, 623 A.2d at 653. The United States
Supreme Court recently determined that gender-based strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and extended the Batson procedures to such strikes. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994).
57. Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 834 (Cal. 1991)(Lucas, C.J., concurring).
Spring 1998]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
To remedy this reluctance to engage in federal constitutional analysis, state
courts should engage in analysis of their own constitutional charters.58 Where a state
court's decision rests on that state's constitution, a state court need not worry that
the United States Supreme Court might disagree with its constitutional
interpretation.59 Furthermore, independent state constitutional interpretation would
result in greater experimentation in the area of constitutional analysis.' This, in
turn, is important to the development of federal constitutional law. In the Batson
opinion itself, the Supreme Court relied a great deal on how the state courts had
been handling problems of racial discrimination in the selection of juries.6' By
allowing the issue to "percolate"'62 in the state courts, the United States Supreme
Court was able to draw from a broad body of law before revisiting its decision in
Swain v. Alabama.'l Notably, California and Massachusetts65 adopted an approach
under their state constitutions rather than interpret the federal constitution or try to
predict whether the United States Supreme Court would revisit its prior decision.
Though the Court did not adopt the reasoning of these opinions completely, it
nonetheless benefited from state constitutional analyses. Thus, independent state
constitutional interpretation is important both for the state itself, as well as for the
development of national law.
II. METHODS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The ways in which state courts approach the threshold question of when to rely
on the state constitution and at what point to consider federal precedent, if at all,
break down into roughly four, well-recognized categories:' dependent,
supplemental, dual sovereignty, and primacy. In each jurisdiction studied by this
author it is possible to find at least one example of more than one method,
indicating the degree of confusion, indecisiveness or disagreement within state
courts as to which method is best.
58. The United States Supreme Court will not review a state court decision if the decision contains a "plain
statement" of the state law basis of the decision. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). See also
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 MISS. LJ. 223, 229-30 n.25
(1984).
59. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1041 (requiring state courts to issue a "plain statement" that its decision rests on
"independent and adequate" state law grounds to preclude United States Supreme Court review).
60. In addition to potential reversal by the United States Supreme Court, state court constitutional decisions
might also be subject to voter review. Approximately 24 states have some form of direct democracy, and most of
these permit the voters to amend the state constitution by means of the voter initiative. For a discussion of
California's experience in this respect, see Rachel A. Van Cleave, A Constitution in Conflict: The Doctrine of
Independent State Grounds and the Voter Initiative in California, 21 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 95 (1993).
61. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 70, 82 n.1, 83, 99 n.23 (1986).
62. Kaye, supra note 19, at 56-57.
63. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
64. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 757-59 (Cal. 1978).
65. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 510-11 (Mass. 1979).
66. See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Piter, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on




The first method has been labeled "parallelism,"'67 "lock-step,"6 "clone, ' 69 and
"absolute harmony."7° This method is essentially dependent interpretation. That is,
state courts simply assume that rights declared in the state charter are equal or
parallel to federal precedent interpreting the federal Bill of Rights. While this
method can come in different forms,7' the result is the same; the court fails to
engage in independent analysis of the state constitutional provision.
California's constitutional history provides examples of the dependent approach.
In Blair v. Pritchess,72 the California Supreme Court confronted the question of
whether the constitutional protection against illegal "seizures and searches"
extended to civil matters, specifically a "claim and delivery" law which allowed
officers to enter and search homes and seize property without a warrant.73 The court
began its analysis with a discussion of Camara v. Municipal Court,74 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that inspections for building code violations are
subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.75 In reaching its conclusion as
to what the Federal Constitutioii required, the California court stated that
[s]ince sections 19 and 13 of article I of the California Constitution are
substantially equivalent to the Fourth Amendment and to the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution respectively, our analysis of the validity of the claim and delivery
law in respect to the above provisions of the federal Constitution is applicable
in respect to the above sections of the state Constitution.76
Thus, the state constitution was but a mere after-thought.77
Similarly, Texas courts of last resort have deferred to federal interpretation of
analogous rights. In Brown v. State,78 on remand from the United States Supreme
Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it would continue to adhere
to federal Fourth Amendment interpretation until "statutorily or constitutionally
67. Marshall J. Tinkle, State Constitutional Law in Maine: At the Crossroads, 13 VT. L REv. 61, 74
(1988).
68. David M. Skover, Address: State Constitutional Law Interpretation: Out of "Lock-Step" and Beyond
"Reactive" Decisionmaking, 51 MONT. L REv. 243, 245 (1990).
69. Teachout, supra note 4, at 22 n.20 (citing Charles Douglass, Il, Federalism and State Constitutions,
13 VT. L REV. 127, 138 (1988)).
70. Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 645.
71. See Tinkle, supra note 67, at 74 n.67, for examples of the Maine Supreme Court's application of the
parallel method of state constitutional law analysis.
72. 486 P.2d 1242 (Cal. 1971).
73. See id. at 1246.
74. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
75. See id. at 540.
76. Blair, 486 P.2d at 1251 n.6 (emphasis added). See also Gray v. Hall, 265 P. 246, 252 (Cal. 1928)
("[d]ue course of law under the state Constitution and due process of law under the Federal Constitution mean the
same thing").
77. Other examples of the dependent approach are also present in the area of illegal seizures and searches,
and equal protection. See, e.g., People v. Bradley, 460 P.2d 129, 131 (Cal. 1969) (search and seizure guarantees
are "essentially identical"); Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 329 P.2d 689, 695 (Cal. 1958) (the state
and federal equal protection guarantees have been "similarly construed").
78. 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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mandated to do otherwise,"'79 thus assuming that federal and state interpretations are
or should be the same. Likewise, the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.
Gomez ° last year acknowledged a history of adhering to United States Supreme
Court precedent not only when that high court has recognized a particular right, but
also where the Court has declined to recognize an asserted right."s
The problems with the dependent approach echo the reasoning that supports
independent interpretation discussed in Part II of this paper. Namely, such an
approach assumes that interpretation of state and federal constitutions is or should
be identical. On the contrary, state constitutions such as Texas, New Mexico and
California were products of different periods of history, different areas of the
country, with different concerns in mind, as compared to the circumstances
surrounding the drafting of the National Constitution. Rather than abdicate their
"judicial duties and responsibilities,"" state courts should engage in a study of their
state's constitutional heritage.
Furthermore, textual differences between state and federal constitutions
contradict the assumption that state constitutional law was intended to parallel
federal constitutional law. One commentator has suggested that
[t]he sparse language of the [federal] Bill of Rights suggests that federal
delegates, representing a diverse and widely dispersed population and wielding
the power to dispute every word in the document, found it difficult to agree on
details or a greater number of specific rights. By contrast, delegates to individual
state constitutional conventions, who represented more homogeneous local
populations, may have found the going somewhat easier.8 3
Generally speaking, state declarations and bills of rights contain a longer list of
rights, using language that is "richer, more detailed and more specific."'" Most state
constitutions use positive language to declare rights, while the federal constitution
uses "negative," 5 or prohibitory language. 6 As discussed earlier, state constitutions
often contain language and rights simply not provided for in the federal constitu-
tion. 7 These types of differences between state and federal guarantees support the
argument that state courts err when they assume without, or with very little analysis,
that the state right equals or parallels the federal guarantee. However, the point here
is not that there must be a textual difference before state courts may diverge from
79. Id. at 799.
80. 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1(1997).
81. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 76 N.M. 171,413 P.2d 210 (1966); State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497,424 P.2d
782 (1967).
82. Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Clinton, J., concurring).
83. Exum, supra note 37, at 1746. While it is not likely that all state constitutional conventions were
conducted without debate, in California, the provision that stated "[n]o person shall, on account of sex, be
disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation or profession," was adopted without
amendment or debate. See Babcock, supra note 42, at 853 (quoting The Lady Lawyers, San Francisco Chron., Feb.
15, 1879, at 2).
84. Exum, supra note 37, at 1746.
85. See Burt Neubome, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERs U. 881, 883
(1989).
86. See Exum, supra note 37, at 1746.
87. See Neubome, supra note 85, at 893-94, for language found in state constitutions which Professor
Neubome argues could provide the basis for rights for the poor.
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federal interpretation. Rather, the significance of textual differences is that they
indicate that state constitutions were not intended to mimic the federal constitution.
B. Supplemental Interpretation
Another problematic approach to state constitutional law involves an analysis of
the state constitution only once a state court has determined that the asserted claim
fails under the federal constitution.88 This approach has been labeled "supple-
mental,"'8 9 "interstitial,"9° and "second-look." '9 As the dependent approach assumes
that state and federal constitutions are the same, the supplemental approach assumes
that if the federal constitution recognizes and protects the asserted right, the state
constitution must as well. However, where the United States Supreme Court has
declined to recognize an asserted right the state court following this method turns
to the state constitution in this instance only.
An early example of this method and one relied upon by other state courts is the
New Jersey Supreme Court case, State v. Hunt.9 In a concurring opinion in Hunt,
Justice Handler listed several criteria for the New Jersey courts to consider in
deciding whether to analyze the state constitution independently.93 The criteria
appear to be broad enough to allow for frequent departure from United States
Supreme Court precedent: textual differences, legislative history differences, state
cases predating federal changes, state structural differences, a subject of "unique
local interest," a countervailing state or local issue exists, or public attitudes on the
issue differ.94 Despite the breadth of these criteria and the court's insistence that
they are not exclusive, this approach relegates the state constitution to a position of
diminished importance because it mandates independent interpretation only when
the court can point to something different or unique about the state or its constitu-
tion. However, even more troubling is the fact that under this approach a state court
examines the state constitution only if the asserted claim fails under the federal
constitution. This highlights the fact that the state court is relying on the state
constitution to reach a result different from that determined by the United States
Supreme Court, placing the state court in a defensive position. The state court must
point to satisfactory reasons for departing from federal precedent. Furthermore,
since the state charter is relevant only when the federal constitution does not
recognize the asserted right, under this approach state court departure will nearly
always result in a broader definition or protection of the asserted right, in express
disagreement with the United States Supreme Court. Such decisions are easily
criticized as "result-oriented."95
88. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 648.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional Rights, 3 GA. ST. L REV.
143, 152 (1986-87).
92. 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
93. See id. at 965-67 (Handler, J., concurring). See Douglass, supra note 69, at 139, and Utter & Pitier,
supra note 66, at 649, for discussions of New Jersey's approach to state constitutional interpretation.
94. See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 964-67 (Handler, J., concurring).
95. See, e.g., Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31,43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (McCormick, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion followed the supplemental approach of examining federal law first. Upon determining that federal
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Finally, by not requiring state courts to examine their state constitution regardless
of the result under the federal constitution, this approach hinders the consistent and
principled development of state constitutional analysis. That is, the state court
engages in independent interpretation only in some instances. Lack of frequent
consideration and analysis of the state constitution distances a state court from its
own charter, thus making it more difficult for a state court to know where to begin
and how to conduct its analysis of the state constitution in those instances requiring
independent analysis.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico announced earlier this year that it would
follow this approach, in State v. Gomez.96 Acknowledging recent efforts of New
Mexico to step out of lock-step, the court stated that "[w]e today specifically adopt
the interstitial in preference to the primacy approach"' relying on prior recent cases
following this method without referring to it expressly. In Campos v. State,
9 8 New
Mexico's high court examined the constitutionality of warrantless searches made
in the absence of exigent circumstances. Although the court did not specifically
indicate a method of interpretation, the court first determined that federal precedent
upholds such arrests, and then went on to analyze the state constitution, holding that
the state constitution required the existence of exigent circumstances, based on state
court precedent recognizing only limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.99
Similarly, in State v. Gutierrez"°° the New Mexico Supreme Court declined to
incorporate as a matter of state constitutional law the United States Supreme Court
holding in United States v. Leon"0 ' which created a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. The court first considered federal precedent and then analyzed
the history and precedent of the state provision in concluding that such a good faith
exception was incompatible with the state constitution." As discussed in part IV
of this paper" these New Mexico cases, though following a method I believe is
flawed, have nonetheless made an important contribution to the second question of
how to go about state constitutional interpretation.
While this approach has resulted in independent state interpretation as to some
portions of the state constitution, it does not, however, develop a consistent body
of state constitutional jurisprudence because the state court does not always
consider the state constitution. Furthermore, this approach does not simply assume
that both constitutions require the same result, but that they also require the same
analysis and rationale for the result, unless one of the "difference criteria" exists.
On a more practical level, the "supplemental" approach provides very little
guidance to state trial courts as to when the state constitution may protect broader
law did not protect the right asserted, it turned to enforcing the right, resulting in the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence.
96. 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (1997).
97. Id. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
98. 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994).
99. See id. at 158-59, 870 P.2d at 120-21.
100. 116 N.M. 431,863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
101. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
102. See Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 432, 863 P.2d at 1053. See also State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d
30 (1989) (court declined to follow the "totality of circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983),
and decided, instead, to adhere to the Aguilar-Spinelli test previously applied in New Mexico courts).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 159-71.
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rights, and it inadequately advises litigants as to when they should rely on the state
constitution in their arguments. This can have an effect on a state court's
willingness to reach a state constitutional issue. Where litigants have failed to assert
a right under the state charter, state courts have refused to consider the claim and
instead rely solely on federal precedent." 4 This issue arose in the New Mexico case,
State v. Gomez, a case in which the court had to engage in detailed analysis as to
whether the defendant had sufficiently preserved an argument based on the state
constitution, in addition to the analogous federal claim. 5 State courts must provide
litigants with guidance as to when the state constitution applies. This will further
the development of state constitutional law by allowing state courts to benefit from
advocacy based on state constitutional research and argument.
C. Dual Sovereignty
A third approach, which is recommended by a number of commentators is called
the "dual sovereignty" method." Under this approach a state court is required to
analyze the relevant state and federal constitutional provisions in every case
presenting federal and state constitutional claims. The argument in support of this
method is that it "accommodates, rather than evades, the relationship of state and
federal constitutional rights."' 7 Unlike the above "supplemental" approach under
which state courts only examine their own constitutions if the federal constitution
does not recognize or protect the particular right asserted, state courts applying the
"dual sovereignty" approach can avoid criticisms that they are using the state
constitution merely as a means of avoiding a particular federal precedent with
which they disagree. Commentators acknowledge that "once a court affords
protection under the constitution analyzed first, discussion of the other constitution
is unnecessary dicta.""0° This criticism is relevant if both constitutions protect the
asserted right. However, if after analyzing a claim under both constitutions, the state
court determines that the state constitution provides broader protection than its
federal counterpart, the state court will once again be in the position of having to
justify its "departure" from federal analysis and precedent. Certainly, anytime a
state court interprets its own state's charter it will have to explain its reasons for
reaching its result. But where the state court, on the same facts, determines that the
two constitutions require different results, the state court must do more than simply
explain why the state charter requires a particular result, it will have to explain why
the state charter requires a result different than the federal constitution requires.
This perpetuates the view that state constitutional guarantees are merely secondary
to federal guarantees. Additionally, as with the supplemental approach, where a
state court presents analysis of the federal claim and then interprets the state
104. See City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 744 (N.D. 1993), where the appellant urged the court
to determine as a matter of state constitutional law that Batson extended to gender-based peremptory strikes, but
merely cited to the relevant state constitutional provision, the court stated that this was insufficient to raise the issue
for their consideration.
105. See State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (1997).
106. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 65 1. See also William C. Hill & Michael Marks, Forward: Toward
a Federalist System of Rights, 1984 ANN. SuRv. AM. L 1, 11.
107. Hill & Marks, supra note 106, at 11.
108. Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 652.
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constitution more broadly, critics will charge the state court with engaging in
"result-oriented" interpretation.'0 9
A related problem with this approach is that it permits United States Supreme
Court review of a state court's analysis of a federal constitutional claim. Where a
state court conducts analysis of both the state and federal constitutions, it subjects
its decision to United States Supreme Court review.
According to Michigan v. Long,"' if a state court decision is ambiguous as to
which constitution it is applying, the United States Supreme Court may review the
decision with the assumption that the state court "decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so.''
1  A state court could
avoid such review by including a "plain statement" that the court determined that
state law dictated the result. If, under the dual sovereignty approach, a state court
determines that both constitutions require the same result, its analysis may be
subject to Supreme Court review. If the Supreme Court disagrees with the state
court's analysis of federal law, it will reverse. The state court will then have to
explicitly state that its result was required under the state constitution if it wishes
to preserve its earlier ruling. This will highlight the differences between the two
courts and once again put the state court on the defensive to explain its reasons for
initially reaching the same result under both constitutions, and then later relying
exclusively on the state constitution to reach a result contrary to that required under
the federal constitution.
Additionally, this situation could raise doubts as to the constitutional analytical
abilities of the state supreme court; if they interpreted the federal constitution
incorrectly, perhaps they also misinterpreted the state constitution. One example of
this is People v. Class."2 The New York Court of Appeals held that an officer's
nonconsensual entry into the defendant's vehicle to acquire the vehicle
identification number violated both the federal and state constitutions."
3 The United
States Supreme Court reversed as to the federal constitution and then remanded."
4
On remand the state court had to reiterate its reliance on the state constitution and
refused to alter its initial state constitutional analysis merely because the United
State Supreme Court disagreed with the interpretation of the federal constitution."
5
A state court can avoid review by the United States Supreme Court by complying
with the requirements of Long, but it then becomes subject to another type of
criticism, that of evading Supreme Court precedent. Several examples of state court
"evasion" of Supreme Court review exist from the early days of "New Federalism."
For example, in People v. Krivda,"6 the California Supreme Court determined that
109. See, e.g., George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson. All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review
Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 975 (1979); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State
Court Activism, 63 TEX. L REv. 995 (1985) (criticizing "activism" of state courts under the banner of new
federalism).
110. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
111. Id. at1041.
112. 494 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1986).
113. See id. at 445.
114. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 119 (1986).
115. See Class, 494 N.E.2d at 446.




a warrantless search of a garbage can placed on the curb for collection was
unlawful."' Upon Supreme Court remand for a determination of which constitution
required this result, the California Supreme Court, without explanation, asserted
reliance on both the federal and state constitutions."' Such a statement by a state
court precluded United States Supreme Court review, further supporting the
criticism that independent interpretation was merely a way of avoiding federal
precedent." 9
While stated reliance on both constitutions is no longer sufficient to avoid
Supreme Court review, under Long the required "plain statement" similarly
precludes Supreme Court review without requiring much depth of analysis. One
commentator argues that this "trivializes the role of judging in both the state courts
and in the United States Supreme Court if the outcome turns not on an appreciation
of the logic of decision but rather upon the incantation vel non of magic words."' 2
Certainly, the advocates of the "dual sovereignty" approach would not condone
such empty reliance on state constitutions. Nonetheless, this approach does not
adequately protect against results such as those described above.
Another argument offered for the "dual sovereignty" method is that state courts
have an important role in interpreting the federal constitution and this approach
allows state courts continued participation in the shaping of federal constitutional
law.' Indeed, state courts have an important role to play in constitutionalism
generally. However, it is not clear that the "dual sovereignty" method of state
constitutional analysis is necessary to further this interest. Where a state court
engages in thoughtful and in-depth analysis, its opinion can have an influence on
the development of federal law, or on the law of other states, even if the decision
rests solely on the state's constitution rather than on the federal charter. For
example, as discussed earlier, the California Supreme Court's decision in People
v. Wheeler, was one of several state court opinions'24 which the United States
Supreme Court looked to when reconsidering its decision in Swain v. Alabama.25
The California Supreme Court, however, did not base its opinion on the federal
equal protection clause, but rather relied on the state right to trial by jury.'26 In
evaluating the use of peremptory challenges based on a prospective juror's race, the
California Supreme Court examined federal precedent regarding a right to a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. 27 The court also
looked at California precedent to hold that such a practice violated the California
117. Seeid. at 1268.
118. See Krivda, 504 P.2d at 457. See also People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1969) (warrantless search
of garbage can in an open back yard violated both the state and federal constitutions).
119. See, e.g., Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 109, at 983.
120. Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent "Adequate and Independent State Grounds"
Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 371, 378 (1991).
121. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 652.
122. See supra notes 20-36 and accompanying discussion.
123. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
124. See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1009-1013 (Del. 1985); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94
N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980). See also, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 n.I (1986).
125. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
126. "Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all ..... CAL. CONST. art. L, § 16.
127. See Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 755-57.
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guarantee of a jury trial. 2 However, the court did follow the Swain requirement
that a defendant demonstrate "systematic exclusion" of a group of jurors from the
venire. "29 The court framed the issue as pertaining to the right to a jury trial, rather
than as an equal protection issue. 3' The court then declined to follow Swain, stating
that "[b]ecause a fundamental safeguard of the California Declaration of Rights is
at issue, . . . 'our first referent is California Law' and divergent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court 'are to be followed by California courts only when
they provide no less protection than is guaranteed by California law."""' The
purpose of discussing Wheeler is to illustrate that although a state court might rely
on its own constitution, and on a different right-jury trial rather than equal
protection-its reasoning can nonetheless be useful and influential in the
development of federal law. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court did not
alter its precedent regarding fair cross-section, but did reconsider and change its
holding under Swain using a rationale similar to that employed by the California
Supreme Court and that of other state courts.' It would certainly be unfortunate if
a result of the "state constitutional revolution,""' 3 were that state courts lost their
role in the development of federal law. However, this potential danger is not very
great, nor is it necessarily remedied by the "dual sovereignty" method of
constitutional analysis.
D. Primacy
The final method is called the "primacy approach."' 34 This method of
interpretation requires a state court to always analyze a state constitutional claim
first. 35 Where the state constitution provides recognition and protection of the
asserted right, the state court's analysis ends. Under the primacy approach a state
court analyzes the federal constitution only to determine that the interpretation
under the state constitution has not gone below the "federal floor" when the state
court declines to enforce the asserted right under the state constitution. 36 This
approach assumes that state constitutions serve as the primary sources for the
protection of individual rights, with the federal Bill of Rights providing a safety net
128. See id. at 757-60.
129. Seeid. at767.
130. Seeid. at754.
131. Id. at 767 (quoting People v. Pettingill, 578 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1978)) (court refused to follow Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), and held that the California Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
precludes the use of illegally obtained statements even for the purposes of impeachment).
132. More recently, in deciding that the procedure set out in Batson applies to gender-based peremptory
strikes, the United States Supreme Court once again looked to how such an issue had played out in the state courts.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
133. LAZER, supra note 10, at 1.
134. Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 647; Shaw, supra note 10, at 1025-28.
135. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 647.
136. See LA'ZER, supra note 10, at 5, explaining the difference between the interpretation of a right and its
enforcement. Where a state constitution requires a narrower interpretation of a right than under the federal
constitution, a state court must nonetheless, enforce the broader federal right in order to avoid violating the
Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
[Vol. 28
INTERPRETATION AND METHODOLOGY
of minimum protections.' 37 The arguments supporting this approach parallel some
of the reasons for independent state constitutional analysis discussed earlier.13 1
Early on in the period of "New Federalism,"'39 Justice Linde argued that state
constitutions came first as a matter of history and should therefore come first as a
matter of analysis when state courts consider constitutional protections.""4 This
argument is premised on the fact that before the days of "incorporation," when the
United States Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to bind states to most protections in the federal Bill of Rights,' 4'
individuals looked exclusively to their state charters for protection of their rights.
Whether this analysis is relevant to states, which adopted constitutions long after
the federal convention, is not very important. Rather, the significance is that since
before, and for a long time after, the adoption of the federal Bill of Rights, those
rights were understood to bind only the federal government. 42
In addition to the historical primacy of state constitutional guarantees, the
primacy approach furthers the interest of aiding in the development of state
constitutional law by requiring state courts and litigants to study the constitutional
heritages of their states, as well as the state's prior caselaw. The primacy approach
also accords state constitutions a greater degree of prominence. The more
accustomed the public becomes to hearing of the protections under their state's
constitution, the more likely individuals are to turn to their state constitutions first
for protection of their rights. 43 Independent evaluation of state constitutional
guarantees may lead individuals "to face closer to home some fundamental values
that the public has become accustomed to hav[ing] decided for them by the faraway
oracles in the marble temple."'" Finally, such an approach is less susceptible to
criticisms of being result-oriented. Simply because a state court examines the state
charter first does not necessarily mean that the result will always be a broader
interpretation of a particular right than federal court interpretation of the similar
federal right.
Commentators have argued that the primacy approach is not necessary due to the
incorporation of nearly all provisions of the federal Bill of Rights by the United
137. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 503 ("one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double
source of protection for the rights of our citizens"); Exum, supra note 37, at 1748 ("federal and state constitutional
rights stand side-by-side .... a double-edged sword in the service of freedom"); Shaw, supra note 10, at 1025 ("the
U.S. Constitution providing a second layer of protection").
138. See supra notes 10-65 and accompanying text.
139. This term has been used to describe the period dating from the early 1970s during which the United
States Supreme Court began to narrow individual rights, while state courts relied on their own charters to continue
prior protections or expand such protections. See Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Alaska
Supreme Court: Criminal Procedure Rights and the New Federalism, 1960-1981, 18 GONZ. L REv. 221 (1982);
Slobogin, supra note 11 at 657; Donald E. Wilkes Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death
of a Phoenix?, in DEvELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTrIUrTIONAL LAw 166 (1985); Robin B. Johanson, Note, The New
Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297 (1997).
140. See linde, supra note 3, at 380-84.
141. Before the adoption of the Fburteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights was understood as a restraint on
the federal government only. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
142. See id. (rejecting the argument that the Fifth Amendment protection against the taking of property
without compensation restrained states as well as the federal government).
143. See linde, supra note 3, at 394.
144. Linde, supra note 3, at 395.
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States Supreme Court.145 This criticism appears to be more directed at the idea of
independent interpretation itself, rather than at this particular method of
interpretation. Thus, this criticism ignores the benefits of independent interpretation
discussed earlier."4 The second criticism of the primacy approach is that in certain
areas of law, primarily the criminal justice area, uniformity of laws is necessary.'
47
Therefore, state courts should adhere to federal precedent in order to avoid
development of separate rules with respect to criminal rules. This is essentially an
argument for the "dependent" approach. 4a While specific concerns for uniformity
may constitute a principled reason for adopting federal precedent in a particular
case, this concern is insufficient to justify complete dependence upon federal
precedent by state courts, stifling experimentation and constitutional discourse.
Critics also argue that "unless conditions peculiar to [the state] support a
different meaning," state courts should follow federal precedent.'49 Once again, this
argument assumes that the United States Supreme Court has not only come up with
the best result and analysis of the issue, but also the best resolution of the issue for
all .of the fifty states. Even characterizing this criticism more narrowly, it is
inadequate to advance the independent development of state constitutional law. In
one sense, the "dependent unless good reasons exist" approach acknowledges the
differences among the states, and the possibility that each state constitution might
include textual differences in their constitutions, as a result of different
constitutional heritages. The requirement that state courts be able to point to some
good reason for departure is often used in jurisdictions that employ the
supplemental approach described above, and accommodates differences among
states and between states and the federal constitution. 50 However, this approach
results in independent constitutional analysis for some guarantees set forth in the
state charter, but dependent interpretation for others. For example in State v.
Hunt,' where Justice Handler set out the "nonexclusive criteria," he claims that
these are not intended to require adherence to federal precedent; yet in his framing
of each criterion his perspective is always in reference to the federal constitution.'
For example, in referring the state court to the text of the state constitution, Handler
states, "[a] state constitution's language may itself provide a basis for reaching a
result different from that which could be obtained under federal law."'
153 Thus
145. See Utter & Pitier, supra note 66, at 648.
146. See supra notes 10-65 and accompanying text.
147. See Max Nicholas Hanson, Note, New Hampshire v. Canelo: Federalism and the Exclusionary
Rule-Different State and Federal Constitutions or Just Differing Opinions?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 395, 403 n.74
(1996) (citing Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once "New Judicial Federalism" and Its Critics, 64 WASH.
L. REV. 5, 6 (1989) and Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial
Restraint, 63 DENv. U. L. REV. 85, 90-98 (1985)). See also People v. Gonzalez, 465 N.E.2d 823 (N.Y. 1984)
(deciding to follow United States Supreme Court precedent on inventory searches in the interest of uniformity).
148. See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
149. See People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237,246 (Cal. 1975) (Clark, J., dissenting). See also People v. Maher,
550 P.2d 1044, 1050 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("[ulnless its text, history or function supports a broader
construction, a state constitutional provision affords no greater right than the parallel provisions of the federal
Constitution").
150. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
151. 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
152. See id. at 965 (Handler, J., concurring).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
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indicating that without such a textual difference, a different interpretation or result
would not be principled.
The notion of interpreting some state constitutional provisions in a dependent
manner, and others in an independent manner is similar to the problems which arise
when voters pass voter initiated constitutional amendments forcing state courts to
adhere to United States Supreme Court precedent." One commentator calls this
"the problem of the divided constitution."'55 Such partial "forced linkage' '5 6 raises
the same types of issues discussed above with respect to dependent interpretation.5 7
Additionally, the effect of a divided state constitution is to minimize a state court's
opportunity to become more familiar with its state constitutional heritage, thus
limiting the potential for reasoned independent interpretation when differences
exist.
The better approach is for state courts to begin with their own state charters
whenever a constitutional claim is asserted. Instead of looking for reasons to decide
a particular issue in a manner contrary to federal precedent, state courts should
examine their own charters to determine whether reasons exist to follow the federal
interpretation. This is similar to the way in which a state court might look to the
decisions of other state courts for guidance. Certainly, adherence to the primacy
approach does not mean that state courts may never refer to federal precedent.
Rather, state courts should consider every possible source for analysis including
precedent of the United States Supreme Court, but consider it the same way a state
court considers jurisprudence from other states in deciding whether to adopt such
an approach for the state's law.
A number of state courts purport to follow the "primacy" approach to state
constitutional law.'58 Unfortunately, these states do not apply this approach on a
consistent basis.' 59 California had begun to apply the primacy approach on a
somewhat consistent basis during the early part of the New Federalism period.W
However, the California Supreme Court has undergone personnel changes and has
154. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d) ("[E]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal
proceeding .... "); People v. May, 748 P.2d 307 (Cal. 1988) and In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985) (both
interpreting the above provision as mandating California courts not to apply the exclusionary rule more broadly
than it is applied by the United States Supreme Court). See also FLA. CONST. art I, § 12.
This right [prohibiting search and seizures] shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right shall not be admissible in
evidence if such articles or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id.
155. Ronald I.L Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEx. L REv. 1095,
1117-23 (1985).
156. This term "describe[s] the impact of electoral decisions ... requiring state courts to equate state
constitutional law with federal constitutional law." Slobogin, supra note 11, at 657.
157. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
158. See Utter & Pitler, supra note 66, at 647.
159. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalisr, 90 MICH. L REv. 761, 801-04
(1992) (criticizing the New Hampshire Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the primacy approach); Shaw,
supra note 10, at 1043-45 (criticizing the Oregon Supreme Court's inconsistent application of the primacy
approach).
160. See Van Cleave, supra note 60, at 112-15.
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had a rather rocky history in developing its state guarantees, especially in the area
of criminal justice rights.' 6' One reason for this is that during the days of
incorporation when the United States Supreme Court began to rapidly apply most
of the federal rights to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, California and other states, automatically looked to the federal
precedent to avoid violating federal law.6 2 During this time of "co-option ' 63 it was
"easy for the state courts ... to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than
federal constitutional law"'' and not consider what their state charter might require.
Even where a state supreme court had been analyzing its own declaration or bill of
rights independently, having ignored state charters for a number of years made it
difficult to return to independent analysis without evoking criticisms of being result-
oriented-simply desiring to disagree with a United States Supreme Court
pronouncement. 165 A second explanation for California's troubled history of
independent constitutional analysis may be that the California Supreme Court did
not provide litigants with any criteria under which the court would analyze the state
constitution independently."6 The California Supreme Court did not expressly state
that they would always look to the state declaration of rights first.67 If the court had
made such a pronouncement, litigants would have then been on notice that they
should always consider possible interpretations and arguments based on the state
guarantee. This would have provided the court with more information on the state
guarantees to consider in their analysis.
In the criminal justice area, this lack of guidelines for applying the state
constitution resulted in a voter backlash. 68 One such initiative amended the
constitution to prohibit use of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases unless
required by federal constitutional law. 69 Another initiative adopted by the voters
would have required the state courts to adhere to federal precedent when
interpreting the rights of criminal defendants. 70 This fluctuation by the California
161. See id. at 122-29.
162. See A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA.
L. REV. 873, 878 (1976) (stating that courts "[ffell into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal
constitutional law").
163. Slobogin, supra note 11, at 657.
164. Howard, supra note 162, at 878.
165. See sources cited supra note 147.
166. See Van Cleave, supra note 60, at 122-29.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Proposition 8 was passed by the voters in June 1982. See CAL. CONST., art. l, § 28 credits (West 1983).
170. The relevant section of Proposition 115 added the following language to the California Declaration of
Rights:
In criminal cases the rights of a defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process of law,
to the assistance of counsel, to be personally present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial,
to compel the attendance of witnesses, to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, to privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against
himself or herself, to not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the
imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall be construed by the courts of this state in a
manner consistent with the Constitution of the United States. This Constitution shall not be
construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in
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Supreme Court as to the independent nature of the California Constitution may
explain why the court has not expressed the extent to which it will examine the state
declaration of rights independently.
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
The bulk of this article has focused on the "when" of state constitutional
interpretation, that is the method used by state courts to determine when the court
will rely on the state charter, and at what point federal precedent will enter the
analysis. The second question relates to the "how" of state constitutional
interpretation. Upon deciding to examine the state charter, courts face the
formidable task of figuring out what to do with the state constitution. The task is
formidable because state courts embarking on independent analysis must face
several potential constraints that can box-in the court's ability to independently
analyze the state charter. For example, where the result of independent inter-
pretation is one that diverges from federal precedent, state courts are subject to the
criticism of being "result-oriented." Typically, state courts attempt to overcome or
preempt this criticism by pointing to something "unique" or "peculiar" about their
state constitution or history. This type of analysis can subject the court to the
criticism that they are really not engaging in independent constitutional theorizing,
but instead beginning from the presumption that the federal constitution applies
"unless." Certainly, the theories of constitutionalism employed by the United States
Supreme Court are also criticized. However, given the extreme difficulty of
amending the federal constitution, criticisms of the Supreme Court's decisions
result primarily in a plethora of law review articles. Criticisms of interpretational
theories of state supreme courts can and often do result in amendments to the state
charter, or even in the recall of judges, as the State of California has painfully
discovered.' This section describes some examples of theories state courts have
used to interpret their constitutions, as well as how these other aspects of state
constitutions can operate to constrain interpretation.
Although for organizational purposes it is useful to separate the two questions
of when and how, they do overlap. For example, where courts follow the "criteria
approach" as described by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hunt,172 those
courts answer both questions at the same time. First, if they follow the criteria as
set out by Justice Handler, state courts answer the question of "when" with the
supplemental approach, which means that if the asserted right is not recognized
under the national constitution, and the court is able to point to a difference between
the two constitutions, the court will interpret the state charter. At the same time,
however, such courts also answer the question of "how" by relying on the difference
juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the Constitution of the United
States.
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 24 (emphasis added). However, the California Supreme Court ruled that this provision
amounted to a revision of the constitution, and the voters may only amend the constitution using the initiative. See
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990).
171. See Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconstruction of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1877, 1884 (1988); John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: the Campaign,
the Electorate and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
172. 450 A.2d 952, 965 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
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discovered, whether it be textual, historical, or otherwise, in order to justify a
different rationale and perhaps a different result."" In State v. Hunt, the New Jersey
Supreme Court determined that the warrantless search and seizure of the
defendant's telephone toll billing records violated the New Jersey Constitution.""
The court relied on a state statute that made it a misdemeanor to tap a telephone line
as well as state precedent supporting a stronger protection of privacy.'75 Justice
Handler in coming up with criteria for independent analysis did so based on the
desire to avoid criticisms that "discovery of unique individual rights in a state
constitution does not spring from pure intuition but, rather, from a process that is
reasonable and reasoned.'47 Justice Handler apparently had in mind the danger of
unprincipled analysis when he cited to the, then recent, voter initiative in California
which purported to bind that state's supreme court to federal interpretation, after
that court had been praised as "the birthplace of th[e] new judicial
independence."' 7 7 This analysis served to support the legitimacy of the result and
rationale reached by the court, to promote an in-depth examination of the state's
constitutional history which in turn adds to the richness of state constitutionalism,
and was an important first step in more principled analysis of a state constitution.
7 1
Despite the laudable goal of engaging in principled decision-making to avoid the
criticism of being merely result-oriented, this approach is subject to criticisms
similar to those of the supplemental approach. This theory assumes that state
constitutionalism is the same as federal constitutionalism unless the state court is
able to point to a uniqueness in the state charter. By relying on some unique aspect
of the state constitution in answering the question of how it will interpret the state
constitution, the state court ends up isolating itself from the national discourse and
debate on constitutionalism.77 The idea is that where the reasoning and result are
due to something unique to that state or its constitution, other jurisdictions may be
reluctant to rely on the precedent unless the same unique aspect is present in the
jurisdiction, whether federal or state. This raises yet another criticism of the criteria
approach as a theory of interpretation-skepticism that any state truly has a unique
aspect of constitutional dimensions. As one scholar has put it,
Americans are now a people who are so much alike from state to state, and
whose identity is so much associated with national values and institutions, that
the notion of significant local variations in character and identity is just too
implausible to take seriously as the basis for a distinct constitutional
discourse."
173. See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
174. See id. at 957. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which the court in Hunt "surmised"
supported a conclusion that the search did not violate the federal constitution.
175. See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 955.
176. Id. at 967 (Handler, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 964, (quoting Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court
Review and Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CRM. L. REV. 737, 740 (1976)).
178. Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court has adopted these criteria for interpreting its state
constitution, and answers the question of when by using the supplemental method. See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d
808 (Wash. 1986).
179. See Gardner, supra note 4. at 777.
180. Gardner, supra note 4, at 819.
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Where the criteria approach has resulted in an interpretivist theory, relying on
text and history,"'1 state courts have been criticized for employing a theory long
considered fraught with problems as to the federal constitution. 1 2 A recent example
of a state court struggling with the answer to the "original intent" question is seen
in the California case, Sands v. Morongo Unified School District."3 The substantive
issue in Sands involved the constitutionality of religious invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies.8 4 Aside from the lack
of any consensus as to the "method of interpretation," that is when the California
Supreme Court will turn to the state charter,8 5 the justices disagreed as to the
history surrounding the adoption of the provisions at issue, thus supporting the view
that original intent jurisprudence is problematic.
The criticisms of state courts examining state constitutional history may be valid
if the goal of examining such history is to discern an "original intent."'1 6 However,
examination of history by a state court can serve the purely educative function of
informing the court, lawyers and the people generally of that state's constitutional
history, perhaps promoting either pride or shame, but at a minimum, awareness. In
addition, given the fact that state constitutions, especially those of western states
were adopted long after the Federal Constitution, consideration of history provides
context in which a court can understand what the prevailing issues of the day were
and how the constitution reflected this. Such a consideration of historical
circumstances also furthers understanding of the many amendments to state
constitutions.8 7 Used in this way, the history of the state constitution or of a
particular provision is valid and reasonable.
Some relatively recent state supreme court opinions appear to take steps beyond
the criteria approach by not emphasizing difference. By not relying on differences
between the state and federal constitutions, such opinions further the state court's
participation in constitutionalism generally. For example, the New Mexico Supreme
Court recently declared that it would follow the supplemental approach in State v.
Gomez.' Under this approach, the court determined that it would examine the state
constitution only if after analysis of the federal constitution and precedent the court
determines that the right asserted is not protected. Upon turning to the New Mexico
Constitution, the court stated that it would diverge from federal precedent in one of
three instances.8 9 First, where "distinctive state characteristics [are present]," the
181. See Maltz, supra note 109, at 995.
182. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, 22 RUTGERS LJ. 841,
850(1991).
183. 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991).
184. See id. at 867.
185. Of the five justice majority, three justices, Kennard, Mosk and Broussard, held that the practice violated
both the state and federal constitutions, adopting the dual sovereignty method and two justices, Lucas and Arabian,
agreed that the practice violated the federal constitution, but found it unnecessary to examine the state
constitution, following the dependent method. See id. at 810-44.
186. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Forward: Symposium on State Constitutional History: In Search of a Usable
Past, 53 ALB. L REv. 255, 258 (1989)(asserting that "constitutional history is valuable whether or not one
subscribes to a jurisprudence of original intent").
187. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. State, 753 P.2d 939 (Or. 1988).
188. 122 N.M. 777, 783, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (1997).
189. See id.
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court will look to its own state charter.'" The existence of distinctive state
characteristics seems to embrace aspects of the criteria approach, thus adding little
to a consideration of theories of state constitutionalism. Second, the court stated that
it would resort to the state constitution when "federal analogs" were undeveloped. 9 '
The consideration of the lack of controlling federal jurisprudence answers the
concern discussed previously of state court attempts to forecast United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence by imposing upon the court a duty to analyze the issue
without deferring the question and waiting for the United State Supreme Court to
take up the issue, as one justice in the California Sands case argued for. 92 Finally,
and most significantly, if the state court determines that the federal analysis is
flawed the state court will not rely on it. 93 The New Mexico Supreme Court's
express decision to critically examine federal jurisprudence and diverge from it
where that court finds it to be flawed is an example of a state court exercising
"independent judgment" and thus an important step. This theory of interpretation
moves beyond a "discourse of distinctness"194 and engages the state court in
constitutional discourse, as long as the examination of federal precedent amounts
to more than mere "unprincipled rejectionism."' 5
In State v. Gomez, 96 the New Mexico Supreme Court decided not to follow
United States Supreme Court precedent establishing a bright line exception to the
Fourth Amendment permitting a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped car and
of any closed containers in the car. Despite prior adherence to federal precedent, the
court in Gomez declared "[w]e no longer follow United States Supreme Court
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in our interpretation of Article II, Section
10 [of the New Mexico Constitution]." '97 In Gomez, the court examined state
precedent supporting a "strong preference for warrants," '198 and the reasons warrants
are important. The court then concluded that the requirement could be dispensed
with only where there is a showing of exigent circumstances.199
The New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Cordova2' refused to follow the
United States Supreme Court precedent of Illinois v. Gates"' finding that the
reasons the Supreme Court gave for departing from the Aguilar-Spinelli test had not
190. Id. (citing Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L
REV. 1324, 1359 (1982)).
191. See id.
192. See Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 834 (Cal. 1991)(Lucas, C.J., concurring)
(stating that the California Supreme Court would "do well to invite and await [the United States Supreme Court's]
views before giving final and definitive answers to complex and difficult questions of constitutional law. In this
way we can give appropriate deference to its views ... and proceed in a fashion that is 'informed but untrammeled'
by federal constitutional principles"). See also discussion of Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992), rev'd sub nom Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993) supra, note 56 and corresponding text.
193. See Gomez, 122 N.M. at 783, 932 P.2d at 7.
194. Gardner, supra note 4 at 777.
195. Barry Latzer, Into the '90s: More Evidence That the Revolution Has a Conservative Underbelly, 4
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17, 31 (1991).
196. 122 N.M. 777, 787, 932 P.2d 1, 11 (1997).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 788, 932 P.2d at 12.
200. 109 N.M. 211,784 P.2d 30 (1989).
201. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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occurred in New Mexico precedent.' Specifically, the rigid application of the two-
prong test evident in some courts had not been a problem in New Mexico courts.
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court had previously relied on United States
Supreme Court precedent, in Cordova the court exercised independent judgment
when considering whether to follow the most recent federal precedent on the
subject.
In considering whether to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
announced in United States v. Leon, 3 the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.
Gutierrez,' engaged in a detailed analysis of the purposes of the exclusionary rule
and how the United -States Supreme Court had moved to greater reliance on the
deterrent aspect of the rule. The court considered its own precedent as well as
precedent of other state supreme courts analyzing the exclusionary rule to decide
that the more important purpose of the exclusionary rule is to protect the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that this could not be furthered
by adopting a good faith exception.2 5 Again, this is an important example of
principled disagreement with the United States Supreme Court which more than
adequately supports independent interpretation.
Principled independent interpretation is extremely important in states like New
Mexico where state court judges may be voted out of office similar to the way in
which members of the legislature may. Thus the cautious approach evidenced by
recent opinions is necessary. In addition, these examples start to engage a court in
greater consideration of and reflection on the charter of their state, thus adding to
the richness of analysis. Furthermore, where state courts engage in principled
analysis, different from United States precedent, they contribute in an important
way to constitutionalism generally. Where the United States Supreme Court sees
that its reasons for adopting the holding in Gates, for example, do not accurately
reflect reality in some states, the federal court might reconsider its analysis. In this
way state courts can be loyal to their state charters yet at the same time contribute
important voices to constitutionalism.
V. CONCLUSION
While it is inevitable that some state judges will seek to apply independent
interpretation with an eye to reaching a result which provides greater protection of
individual rights than under the federal constitution, the "neutral" goal should be
that of developing a body of state constitutional law which does not rely on the
fluctuations of United States Supreme Court precedent and which might eventually
contribute to the analysis of federal constitutional law. The examples discussed in
Part IV are reflective of the current state of the evolution of state constitutional
interpretation, and indicate that state courts are giving greater consideration to both
the question of when and how to interpret their state charters. Increased focus on the
question of how has led state courts to move beyond both the "criteria" approach
202. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at 216, 784 P.2d at 35.
203. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
204. 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
205. See id. at 445, 863 P.2d at 1066.
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and the "unprincipled rejection" approach. Nonetheless, the movement is slow and
cautious due to the limitations peculiar to state courts--ease of constitutional
amendment and voter participation in the election or retention of state judges. These
considerations are not faced by federal judges, and yet can make the job of state
judges extremely difficult, sometimes putting state courts in a no win situation, with
real and tangible consequences such as being voted out of office. Nonetheless, state
courts must do the best that they can taking into account these aspects while
cautiously exploring the possible modes of analysis available to them. As mentioned
at the beginning, if state Rules of Court were to require litigants to raise and brief
state constitutional issues as well as the federal issues, state courts might be aided
in their interpretation of the state constitution, and avoid questions as to whether
litigants properly preserved a state constitutional claim at trial. This was an issue
to which the New Mexico Supreme Court had to devote a great deal of analysis in
State v. Gomez.20°
Justice Handler in the Hunt case,' °7 strongly cautioned against a state
constitutional theory which amounts to "pure intuition" because such a theory
would be unprincipled. Yet, there are examples of state courts engaging in a much
more fluid, but nonetheless principled analysis of their constitutions. These have an
even greater potential for contributing to constitutional discourse. The best example
of state judges exercising independent judgment relying on "moral intuition 208
involve interpretations of state constitutional protections against cruel and unusual
punishment, or cruel or unusual punishment.2" One classic example is Sterling v.
Cupp2l° in which former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde examined not
only traditional sources of persuasive authority such as decisions of sister state
courts, but also Eighteenth Century treatises on penology and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' Another good example of this is the concurring
opinion of Justice Liacos in the Massachusetts case, District Attorney for Suffolk
District v. Watson.2' In this case the Massachusetts Supreme Court was presented
with the question of whether the state constitutional provision prohibiting "cruel or
unusual punishment ' 3 had the same meaning as the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment."2"4 In his concurrence, Justice Liacos
referred to a range of authorities to inform his analysis of the unconstitutionally
cruel nature of the death penalty. For example, he cited descriptions and
206. 122 N.M. 777, 781-87, 932 P.2d 1, 5-11 (1997)(this analysis of preservation was combined with the
court's indication of the method it decided to apply, stating that Gomez preserved his state constitutional claim by
simply referring to the relevant provision because the New Mexico Supreme Court had previously stated that it
would interpret search and seizure rights more expansively than the United States Supreme Court).
207. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
208. See Kahn, supra note 5, at 1161.
209. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. , § 17. 1 credit the idea of using state court interpretations of cruel or unusual
punishment provisions as excellent examples of Kahn's notion of "moral intuition" to a student in my fall, 1997
State Constitutional Law Seminar, Patrick A. Bowser, Class of 1998.
210. 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981).
211. G.A. Res. 217 U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. AIS0 (1948).
212. 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1288 (Mass. 1980)(Liacos, J., concurring).
213. MAsS. CONST. art. 26.
214. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
(Vol. 28
INTERPRETATION AND METHODOLOGY
characterizations of death and humans' fear of death in the Bible, 15 Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics,21 6 Shakespeare,217 and Fyodor Dostoyevsky.2 1 Cases like this
illustrate how a state court's willingness to consider a variety of sources can add to
the richness of constitutional debate and discourse, and the analysis contained in
cases like Sterling v. Cupp and Watson are legitimate and valuable for this very
reason.
215. See Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1291 (Liacos, J., concurring) (citing Job 18:14), at 1292 (citing Corinthians
15:20, 26).
216. See id. at 1291.
217. See id. at 1291-92 nn.10. 11 & 13.
218. See id. at 1294.
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